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TWO QUESTIONS IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.*
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County have
just had before them a contract suggesting two interesting
questions in specific performance. The case bringing the
contract before the court arose as the result of the formation
this winter of the American League Baseball Club, commonly known as the American League, as a rival to the
National League, an organization which has heretofore
included the principal clubs interested in professional baseball. All the local clubs in the different cities, members of
the National League, make with their players contracts, the
form of which is determined at a meeting of the Association.
One of these forms of contract is known as "Players' Contract Form B. Six Months." Players signing this contract
agree to play for one season for the club, and during the
period of their engagement not to play for any other club.
The club has two options, one an option to renew the contract
for two successive seasons, and the other, an option to
discharge the player at any time giving him ten days' notice.
*The second series of articles by Mr. Lewis on the specific performance of contracts, and the defence of lack of mutuality, will appear in
the July number. The first article, one on mutuality, in the eighteenth
century, appeared in the May number.--Ed.
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A player named Lajoie signed such a contract with the
Philadelphia Baseball Club, and played with the club last
season. This season, though the club gave notice that they
exercised their option to re-employ him, he signed a contract
with another club in the rival American League. The Philadelphia Baseball Club filed its bill for an injunction to
restrain Lajoie from playing baseball with the new club; the
new club and also the American League being made parties
defendant.
The court have decided the case against the plaintiff. The
opinion has not yet been published. The case, however, suggests two questions, one nearly half a century old, the other
practically new. The first is: Was the case of Lumley v.
Wagner' properly decided? The second: Should a clause in
a contract giving the plaintiff an option to terminate the
contract prevent the plaintiff from obtaining an order from
a court of equity directing the defendant to perform his
promises?
The contract in Lumley v. Wagner was that the defendant
should sing at the plaintiff's theatre for a period of three
months, and not use during the engagement her talents at
any other theatre, concert, etc. She was restrained from
breaking the negative promise. The legal doctrine which the
case stands for is: that where one of the parties to a contract
has made two promises, one affirmative and the other negative, the one being the correlative of the other, the court can
enforce the negative by injunction, though, as in the case of
a promise to sing, they may be unable to enforce the performance of the affirmative promise.
The early cases in the United States, like the early cases in
England, denied the right to the plaintiff to secure an injunc1

Lumley v. Wagner, I DeGex, M. & G. 6o4, 1852, was decided by Lord

St. Leonards, then Lord Chancellor. He reversed the earlier English
case before Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, of Kembel v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333,

x829.

See also Kimberly v. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340, 1836.

The principle

on which the Vice-Chancellor proceeded was that the object of the
injunction being really to force the defendant to act at the plaintiff's
theatre, the court would not prevent the defendant from acting for any
one else. The opinion of Lord Eldon on the question is left in doubt

by the reports we have of the two cases of Morris v. Coleman, i8 Ves.
437, 1812, and Clarke v. Price, 2 Wilson, 157, i819.
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tion to restrain the breach on the part of the defendant of a
negative promise, which negative promise was the correlative
2
of an affirmative promise that the court could not enforce.
Nearly all the cases mentioned in the note expressly follow
the English cases before Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, of
Kemble v. Kean and Kemberly v. Jennings. Perhaps the,
principal case is that of Hamblin v. Dinneford, where the
plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant, who had contracted to play for the plaintiff for three years and for no one
else during the period of the engagement, from playing for
a rival theatrical manager.
Prior to Lumley v. Wagner, there is no case in this country known to the writer which adopts the principle of the
English case. The first two cases reported subsequently to
the appearance of Lumley v. Wagner apparently approve
of the principle there stated, but in each case the injunction
is refused for other reasons. 3 Curiously enough the first
case in this country actually to follow Lumley v. Wagner,
Hayes v. Willio,4 makes no mention of Lumley v. Wagner,

but from an examination of the early English cases of
Morris v. Coleman and Clarke v. Price the court comes to
the conclusion, that where there is a plain and distinct nega'Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Ed. Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 1835; Barnum v.
Randall, 2 W. L. J. (Ohio) 96, 1844; Burton v. Marshall, 4 Gill. (Md.)
487, 1846 (injunction refused on this and other grounds); Delevan v.
Macarte, 4 W. L. J. (Ohio) 555, 1847, s. c. I Ohio, Dec. 226; Sanquirico
v. Beneditti, i Barb (N. Y. Sup.), 315, 1847.

The earliest case in which the subject is discussed in the United States
is probably De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 264, 1833.
In this case the plaintiff attempted to secure an injunction to restrain
the defendant from "singing for any one else but the plaintiff contrary
to his covenant," before the time had arrived when, under his contract
with the plaintiff, he was obliged to sing for the plaintiff. The injunction was refused on the ground that there was yet no promise which
the defendant had to perform. The court also on this ground refused a
ne exeat to restrain the defendant from leaving the country. The court
treats the whole application with levity, and it is impossible to determine
whether they would have issued the injunction had the application been
made at a time when the defendant was under an obligation to sing for
the plaintiff.
3Fredericks v. Mayer, 13 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 566, 1857; Butler v. Galletti, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465, i86I.
4 1I Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 167, 1871.
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ti.e promise not to perform personal services for any one
else, and the plaintiff merely asks for an injunction to enforce
this negative, and not for an order to compel specific performance of the positive promise, the court will grant the
relief prayed for.5 As just stated in a note, the two English
cases referred to are not clear as to the matter. The other
two reported cases in this country decided between the time
of Lumley v. Wagner and 1871, the date of the decision in
Hayes v. Willio, refuse, though for different reasons, to follow the English case. In the first case, Ford v. Jermon,6
Judge Hare expressly rejects the doctrine of Lumley v.
Wagner, while in the New York case of De Pol v. Sohlke,7
the court refuse to enjoin a dancer from performing at
another house because the plaintiff did not allege or prove
that he suffered any special damage, in addition to the loss of
the defendant's services, from the fact that the defendant
danced elsewhere. This position is directly contrary to that
taken by Lord St. Leonards in Lumley v. Wagner, as in that
case he regarded the fact that the injunction' would tend to
make the plaintiff perform her affirmative promise as a
ground on which the court issued the injunction."
In 1873, the principle of Lumley v. Wagner was adopted
in the case of the Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union
Button Hole Co.9 The defendant in that case had agreed
to manufacture and sell to the plaintiff as many machines
as the plaintiff desired, and not to sell to any one other than
the plaintiff except in France and the city of Boston. The
consideration for the defendant's promise was the promise
by the plaintiff to advertise and push the sale of the defendant's machines. The court admitted that they could not
force the plaintiff to manufacture the patented machine, and
'Page 174, 5.
*6 Phila. (Pa.) 6, 1865.
77 Robt. (N. Y.) 28o, 1867.
'The position taken in the New York case is also taken by Judge
Simonton in Harrisburg Baseball Club v. Athletic Association, 8 Pa.
C. C. 337, 18)o.
91 Holmes, 253, 1873.
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expressly followed Lumley v. Wagner in enforcing the negalive covenant not to sell to any one else but the plaintiff.' 0
This decision was followed a year later in Daley v.
Smith,"- where an actress was restrained from violating
an express negative promise in her contract with the plaintiff
not to act except under the plaintiff's managerfnetL This
decision has been regarded as the leading case in New York
if not in the country,. 2 and since its appearance the trend of
the cases has been, almost without exception, in favor of
enforcing partial performance by issuing the injunction to
restrain the negative promise, though the correlative positive
promise of the defendant cannot be enforced by the court.' 3
0 Page 257, 8:

The importance of the decisibn is somewhat lessened

by the fact that the court also rests the right to the injunction on the
theory that the contract amounted to a grant of the patent, and that
therefore the injunction would have been issued to protect the property
in the patent even if there had not been any contract. See page 258.
49 How. Pr. (N. Y.) i50, 1874.
'" In
view of this and the previous decision it was scarcely in accordance with facts for the Supreme Court of Maryland to say in 1875 that
up to that time no case in this country had followed Lumley v. Wagner.
See Hahn v. Concordia Society, 4,2 Md. 46o, page 465. The court in that
case does not regard Lumley v. Wagner with favor, but the expressions
of the court on this point, in view of the facts of the case before them,
must be considered dicta.

'In the following cases the injunction was issued: McCaull v.
Braham, 16 Fed. 37, 1883; Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v., N. Y., L. E. & W.
Co., 24 Fed. 516, 1885; American Association Baseball Club v. Pickett,
8 Pa. C. C. 232, 189o.
In the following cases, while the principle of Lumley v. Wagner is
expressly approved, the injunction was refused on other grounds. Cort
v. Lassard, 18 Ore. 221, 1889; Phila. Ball Club v'. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. C.
57, 189o; Rogers Mfg. Co. v'. Rogers, 20 Atl. 467 (Conn.), i8go; Burney
v'. Ryle, 91 Ga. 7O1, 1893; Jaccard Jewelry Co. v'. O'Brien, 70 Mo. App.
432, 1897; Arena Athletic Club v. McPartland, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 352,
1899; Roosen v'. Carlson, 46 N. Y. App. Div. 233, 1899.
The following cases are in part expressly based on Lumley v,. Wagner,
but it may be doubted whether the facts of each would not have enabled
an injunction to be issued on the theory that the court was protecting
the property of the plaintiff. Xenia Real Estate Co. v,. Macy, 47 N. E.
147 (Ind. Sup.), 1897; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157
N. Y. 6o, 1898; Off. 30 N. Y. App. Div. 564, 1898.
As far as the writer is aware there has been no recent reported decision denying in toto the principle on which Lumley v. Wagner is founded.
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There is also a class of cases to which I have not yet
referred, where the injunction to restrain the breach of the
negative promise of the defendant is always issued irrespective of whether the remaining. affirmative promise of the
defendant can be enforced or not. This is a class in which
the action of the court, in restraining the breach of the negative promise, not only enforces in part a contract, but protects property. For instance, A. leases land from B. and B.
covenants to supply A. with water, gas or other commodity,
and in spite of his covenant B. threatens to cut the waterpipes or gas-pipes or do other acts which will prevent him
from fulfilling the covenants in the lease. The court at the
instance of A. restrains B. The ground for these injunctions
as expressed by the courts is not always easy to ascertain.
There are, however, numbers of cases where the courts have
deliberately applied the doctrine of Lumley v. Wagner, disregarding the fact that the injunction issued might be justified on the familiar ground of protection to the property of
1 4
the plaintiff.
Of course the injunction will not be issued where the
plaintiff can be compensated by the payment of money
damages for the loss of the services of the defendant, or the
though the opinion above mentioned of Judge Simonton, in Harrisburg
Baseball Club v. The Athletic Club, decided in 189o, must be regarded
as based on a theory contrary to the spirit which, by enforcing an express
or implied negative, seeks to enforce an affirmative promise which cannot
be enforced directly.
"' Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Union Pacific Ry., 3 Fed. 423, i88o,
page 442; Lacy v. Heuck, 12 W. L. B. 347 (Ohio), 1883. See also Xenia
Real Estate Co. v. Macy, 47 N. E. 147 (Ind. Sup.), 1897; Standard
Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N. Y. 6o, i898. As previously
stated, the case of Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union Button Hole
Co., i Holmes, 253, 1873, proceeds on the double ground of protecting
property and enforcing contracts.
As an illustration of the difficulty of ascertaining the ground on which
the court proceeds, see Hendricks v. Hughes, 117 Ala. 591, 1897, where
the injunction was issued "to prevent the destruction of all contractual
obligations," page 598. Injunctions are also issued to prevent a company
from so acting as to render it impossible for them to perform a duty to
the public, though the court cannot specifically enforce that duty. See,
as an example of this class of cases, Bieneville Water Supply Co. v.
City of Mobile, 112 Ala. 260, 1895.
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loss resulting from the defendant serving others in a similar
capacity. This is but an application to this kind of partial
specific performance of the general rule that specific performance of a contract will not be granted if money damages
at law are a sufficient compensation for the brpg.. The
question whether a contract to play baseball is one the
breach of which inflicts peculiar damage on the employer is
not a question of the dignity of the services, but of the
unique character of the particular services which defendant
is capable of giving.
The services must be peculiar and therefore not capable
of being performed by any one reasonably skilled in the
work to be done. In Frederick v. Mayerl 5 the court says:
"Services which involve the exercise of powers of the mind,
which in many cases, as of writers or performers, are purely
or largely intellectual, may form a class in which the court
will interfere; such services are generally individual and
peculiar." Perhaps a more satisfactory expression of the
rule is given by the Supreme Court of Oregon when, in
6
they say, that the services must be so
Cort v. Lassard,1
unique that in case of default "the same or like services
could not be easily performed. 17 In that case the services
of the defendants, who were acrobats, were not sufficiently
unique under the above rule, not because they did not involve
powers of the mind, but because there was not evidence
before the court that the services agreed to be rendered
could not be performed by any one skilled in gymnastics.
An injunction has been refused in a case where the defendant
contracted to act as manager of the plaintiff's factory.,
In Burney v. Ryle' 9 the court regarded the services of an
insurance agent as not sufficiently peculiar or unique to
warrant an injunction to restrain the defendant in that case
from engaging with another company, and the same conclusion was reached in a case where the defendant had contracted to serve the plaintiff as a salesman in the plaintiff's
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 566, 1857.
i8 Ore. 22r, 1889.
1 Page 227.
Rogers v. Rogers, 2o AtI. 467 (Conn.), i89i.
13

= 9i Ga. 7oi, 1893.

326

TWO QUESTIONS

IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

jewelry store.20
On the other hand the services of
actors, 2 ' singers, 22 professional baseball players 23 and prize
fighters, 2 4 have all been considered sufficiently extraordinary
in the particular cases cited to warrant the assumption that
the loss of services could not be compensated in damages. 2 5
Whatever opinion may be held as to the wisdom of issuing
these injunctions, which tend to effect the performance of.
contracts for personal services of a unique character, a
question which I shall not now enter upon, no one can
doubt, in view of the cases referred to, that the courts of
this country have shown as a whole a strong tendency to
" Jaccard Jewelry Co. v. O'Brien, 70 Mo. App. 432, 1897.
'5 Hayes v. Willio, ii Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 167, 1871.
' McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. 37, 1883.
'American Association Baseball Club v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. C. 232, 189o.
"Arena Athletic Club v. McPartland, 41 N. Y. App. Div. 352, I89
(dicta).
' Sometimes the unique character of the services to be performed by
the defendant arise from the fact that the defendant controls certain
property necessary to the services. See for example Chicago & Alton
Ry. Co. v. N. Y., L. E. and W. Co., 24 Fed. 576, 1895. This is true also
of all the cases cited (supra), note 16.
In England an express negative is now necessary in order that the
injunction may be issued. That is an agreement by A. to work for a
certain period for B. does not give B. the right to restrain A. from
working for any one else unless there is an express promise by B. not to
work for any one but the plaintiff during the period of the contract. See
Whitewood Chemical v. Hardman, L. R., 2 Ch. (189) 416. In Butler
v. Galetti, 21 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 465, 1861, the court points out what they
consider the radical difference between Lumley v. Wagner and the case
before them because of the absence of an express negative clause. In
the later New York case of Daly v. Smith, however, though in that
case the contract contained an express negative, it is evident that the
court did not regard the existence of the express negative as necessary. See 49 How. Pr. (N. Y.), page 56. In Cort v. Lessard, supra
and in Burney v. Ryle, supra, especially in the former case, there are
strong opinions showing that an express negative should not be
considered essential. In both of these cases, however, the injunction
was refused on other grounds. The only direct decision in favor of the
position that an express negative promise is not necessary, that the
writer has been able to find, is one by Judge Arnold in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. This is the case of the
American Association Baseball Club v. Pickett, supra. In that case
the absence of express negative clause is the only point discussed.
The court issued the injunction prayed for.

TWO QUESTIONS IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

grant partial specific performance of these contracts and
thus apply the principle which Lord St. Leonards first
worked out in the much-controverted case of Lumley v.
Wagner.
Let us now turn to our second question, whej)Ler the
presence in a contract of an option to terminate deprives the
plaintiff of all right of specific performance?
Ordinarily where an option is based on a sufficient consideration, the party who has given the consideration for
the option, electing to exercise it, can have specific performance of the contract to the same extent as if the contract
had never contained an option. When a contract contains
an option to purchase, for instance, the election is nothing
more than the performance on the part26of the plaintiff of the
conditions of the defendant's promise.
" Laning v. Cole, 4 N. J. Eq. 229, 1842; Western Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 6
Met. (Mass.) 346, 1843; Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256, 1863;
Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 88, 1865; Smith and Fleck's App., 69 Pa. 474,
1871; Estes v. Furlong, 59 I1. 298, 1871; Reynolds v. O'Neil, 26 N. J.
Eq. 223, 1875; Brown v. Slee, 1O3 U. S. 828, 188o; Waterman v. Waterman, 27 Fed. 827, 1886, page 829; Bradford v. Foster, 87 Tenn. 4, 1888,
page 8; Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84 Cal. 249, 189o; Ross v. Parks, 93
Ala. 153, 189o; Watts v. Kellar, 56 Fed. I, 1893; Sayward v. Houghton,
119 Cal. 545, 1898; Stanton v. Singleton, 54 Pac. 587 (Cal.), 1898; Boyd
v. Brown, 34, S. E. 907 (W. Va.) 1899. There are numerous dicta
contra to the above decisions in many of the earlier cases in this country.
The case of Rider v. Gray, io Md. 282, 1856, is perhaps the only one
where the decision is directly contra. See Geiger v. Green, 4 Gill. (Md.)
472, 1846; Tyson v. Watts, i Md. Ch. 13, 1847; Duvall v. Myers, 2 Md.
Ch. 4Ol, 185o; Bodine v. Glading, 21 Pa. 50, 1853; Snell v. Mitchell, 65
Me. 48, 1876; Mayard v. Brown, 41 Mich. 298, 1879.
In the following cases contracts to purchase in leases at the option
of the plaintiffs' lessees were enforced, the lessee determining to exercise his option and purchase: In re Hunter I. Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) I, I83i;
Stansbury v. Fringer, ii Gil. & John. (Md.) 149, 1840; Kerr v. Day,
14 Pa. 112, 185o; Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 1858; D'Arras v. Keyser,
26 Pa. 249, 1859; DeRutte v. Muldrow, 16 Cal. 505, 186o; Hawalty v.
Warren, I8 N. J. Eq. 124, 1866; Souffrain v. McDonald, 26 Ind. 269,
1866; Kerr v. Purdy, 5o Barb. (N. Y. S. C.) 24, 1866; Willard v.
Tayloe, 8 Wal. (U. S.) 57, 1869; Hall v. Center, 4o Cal. 63, 187o,
Napier v. Darlington, 7o Pa. 64, 1871; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352,
1871; Clark v. Clark, 49 Cal. 586, 1875; Schroeder v. Gemeinder, io Nev.
355, 1875; Newell's App., ioo Pa. 513, 1882; Herrman vt. Babcock, 1o3
Ind. 461, 1885; Page v. Martin, 46 N. J. Eq. 585, 189o; House v. Jackson,
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But all the cases just cited are options of what we may
call an affirmative character. In all the plaintiff has given
consideration for an election to be bound or not, but having
made his election, both parties are equally bound. In none
has the plaintiff an option to terminate the contract. Perhaps the earliest case involving an option to terminate is
that of Marble Co. v. Ripply.17 In that case B., in consideration of the conveyance to him of certain land by A.
covenanted to quarry for A. annually certain amounts of
stone on the land granted. A. had a right "to abandon the
contract at any time, giving one year's notice." B. had to
furnish the marble as long as A. and his heirs might elect
to take it. The court refused A.'s bill for specific performance because of the conduct of the plaintiff, the continuous
nature and personal character of the defendant's covenant,
because of a clause providing for re-entry by the plaintiff
in case of a breach on the part of the defendant, and finally
because of lack of mutuality. On this last point the court
says, "Such performance by Ripply (the plaintiff in the
cross bill for specific performance) could not be decreed or
enforced at the suit of the Marble Company (the defendant
in the cross bill), for the contract expressly stipulates that
he may relinquish the business or abandon the contract at
any time on giving one year's notice; and it is a general
principle that when from personal incapacity the nature of
the contract, or any other cause, a contract is incapable of
being enforced against one party, that party is equally incap'28
able of enforcing it specifically against the other.
The agreement in this case gave Ripply a limited option
to terminate; that is, he could not terminate the contract at
any time, but he could say, "In a year from this day this contract is at an end." The assertion by the court that specific
performance could not be had against the plaintiff because he
Pac. (Or.) Io27, 1893; Bacon v. Ky. Cent. Ry. Co., 25 S. W. (Ky.)
747, 1894; Waters v. Bew, 29 AtI. (N. J. Eq.) 590, 1894; Hayes v.
O'Brien, 149 Ill.
403, 1894; McCormick v. Stephany, 41 At. 84o (N. J.
Eq.), 1848; Madison Ath. Assoc. v. Brittin, 46 AtI. 652 (N. J.Eq.),
32

1900.

IO Wal. (U. S.). 339, 1870.
T*Page 359.
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had within his power the right to terminate the contract at
any time is not therefore strictly correct. Even after giving
notice of a termination of the contract, the plaintiff was
bound for another year, though under the peculiar circumstances of the case the only unexecuted covenants whicl
Ripply was bound to perform after such notice were the sale
of the marble already demanded, and an account to the
defendant of a portion of the proceeds. In view of this last
fact and in view of the fact that there were many other
sufficient reasons for the refusal of the court to grant specific
performance, the case is not a strong one, though in view of
the tribunal which decided it and the number of times it is
cited in the reports, it is, even on the point under discussion,
an important case. As far as it goes it does stand for the proposition that a contract in which the plaintiff has an option to
terminate in a year cannot be enforced in equity on account
of lack of mutuality.2 9
The question raised in Marble Co. v. Ripply received
some attention in the case of the Singer Sewing Machine Co.
v. The Union Button Hole Co.30
In that case, as stated when I referred to the case in
another connection, the Union Button Hole Company had
made a contract by which the Singer Company was to have
the exclusive agency, except in France and the City of
"It may be questioned whether the Supreme Court of the United
States did not unconsciously reverse Marble Co. v. Rippley on the point
under discussion in the case of the Franklin Telegraph Co. v. Harrison,
145 U. S. 459, 1892. The contract in that case as interpreted by Judge
Butler, Judge of the District Court, seems to have been that the plaintiff
had the right to terminate the contract for the telegraphic services of the
defendant at the end of any year, while the defendant's obligations continued as long as the plaintiff chose to pay the yearly price for the
services of the telegraph company, and for the prior use of a particular
wire between Philadelphia and New York. (See page 446.) Judge
Butler's decree granting the plantiff's prayer was affirmed bythe Supreme
Court. It is doubtful, however, whether the Supreme Court did not
regard the plaintiff as also bound to pay the stipulated price per year
for an indefinite time. (See the language of Harlan, J., on page 471.)
At all events the point of lack of mutuality because of any power to
terminate the contract on the"part of the plaintiff was not raised either
by counsel or by the court.
so4 Holmes 253 (U. S. C. C.), 1873.
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Boston, for the sale of a certain patented invention embodied
in a machine for making buttonholes. The Singer Company
agreed to push the sales and the Union Company to furnish
the machines at a stipulated price as called for. The contract
contained the following clause: " . . . . In case the
Singer Manufacturing Company fail to carry out their
agreement as herein expressed, forfeiture of such agency
shall be considered the only penalty for such failure." The
Singer Company alleged in its bill that it had expended a
considerable sum of money in pushing the sale of the
machines, and had sold upwards of one thousand, and that
the Union Company was about to transfer the agency to
another company. One of the prayers of the bill, to which
the defendant demurred, was for an injunction to prevent
this transfer. The defendant contended that the clause
quoted fiom the contract gave the plaintiff the option of
terminating the contract and raised the defence of lack of
mutuality. The court doubts the correctness of this interpretation of the contract, but referring to the Marble Co. v.
Ripply, Judge Lowell says, "I cannot think that the court
(the Supreme Court of the United States) intended to
announce any general proposition that they would never
enforce a contract which one party had a right to put an end
to in a year." 31 The learned judge cites as supporting an
opposite opinion the English cases of Hills v. Croll32 and
Rolfe v. Rolfe. 33 Yet neither of these cases directly involve
the point. In the former the court refuses to grant specific
performance, besides expressly stating that both parties were
bound; that is, one of them could not legally, under the
terms of the agreement, put an end to the obligation to perform his covenant. In the second case cited the court
regarded the contract as divisible and expressly refused to
consider as before them the part in which the plaintiff seems
to have had an option to terminate his obligation. Judge
Lowell also states "that in many of the cases I have cited
the plaintiff had it in his power to end the contract. '3 4 Here
' Page 259.
Phillips, 6o, 1845.

322

'Sim. 88, 1846.
" Page 260.

TWO QUESTIONS IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

the learned Judge must refer to the power of the plaintiff to
end the contract in the sense that the plaintiff could not be
compelled to complete his contract by a court of equity if
he chooses to break it.
The force of the opinion in this case is considerably modified, not only by the fact that the court doubted whether the
contract gave, as a consequence of the clause quoted, an
option to the plaintiff to terminate it, but also by the fact
that the case before the court was more than a bill for the
specific performance of a contract. It was also an effort to
secure protection to a species of property; that is, a grant
of an exclusive right to a patent. That the court would
protect this property, contract or no contract, seems to be
beyond dispute. This at least is the view taken by Judge
35
Lowell.
Though the case- of the Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
The Union Button Hole Co. can scarcely be said to involve
the question of the specific performance of contracts containing an option on the part of the plaintiff to terminate the
contract, it does contain a well-considered expression of
opinion to the effect that the possession of such an option by
the plaintiff will not necessarily defeat the plaintiff's right to
specific performance if he would be otherwise entitled
thereto.
The decision in Marble Co. v. Ripply is expressly followed
in Sturgis v. Galindo.36 Here the contract sought to be
enforced was or had been terminable at the option of the
plaintiff on his giving thirty days' notice. It is proper to
state, however, that the bill was also dismissed on other
grounds. A more important case is one decided by Judge
Cooley, Rust v. Conard.37 In that'case A. agreed to prospect
land belonging to B., and B. to lease to A. on a certain royalty; A. to mine the land in a certain way and have the right
to terminate the lease on thirty days' notice. Judge Cooley
refused specific performance at the instance of A. on two
Page 258. It may also be noted that the bill was considered by the
court as in effect an application for a temporary injunction until the
facts and law could be fully ascertained.
so 59 Cal. 28, 188I.
3747 Mich. 449, 1882.
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grounds: first, because the contract was an inequitable bargain, and second, because of the lack of mutuality which
arose from the power of A. to terminate the contract. The
reason for this last position is somewhat differently stated
than in the earlier United States case. "The court will
also refuse to interfere in any case," says Judge Cooley,
"where, if it were to do so, one of the parties might nullify
its action through the exercise of the discretion which the
contract or law invests him with." It will be noted that this
'is a reason which does not apply to cases where the contract
contains an option on the part of the plaintiff to terminate so
limited, that even after notice to terminate given by the
plaintiff, the defendant would still have the possibility of a
bill to make the plaintiff perform his promises up to the time
the contract comes to an end, as a result of the plaintiff's
notice.
The principle of Rust v. Conard was applied in Iron Age
Publishing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 38 where

the plaintiff had the option to terminate the contract at any
time, and also in HarrisonBaseball Club v. Athletic Association,39 a case in the county courts of Pennsylvania. In both

of these cases, while the court says that the option to terminate the contract on the part of the plaintiff creates a lack
of mutuality sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of the right to
have specific performance of the obligations of the defendant,
there are other grounds for the refusal of the court to grant
the relief sought. In the Alabama case the plaintiff had
unexecuted personal services to perform, while in the Pennsylvania case the court also placed its decision on the ground
that they would not enforce a negative promise of the
defendant where they could not enforce the affirmative
promise of the defendant, in a case where the breach of the
negative promise caused in itself no special damage to the
0
plaintiff.4
"83 Ala. 498, 1887, page 5o9.
'8 Pa. C. C. 337
" The case of the Philadelphia Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. C. 57,
I8go, also a case in one of the Common Pleas Courts of Pennsylvania,
deserves mention in this connection, though it does not directly involve
the question of the effect of the plaintiff's option to terminate the con-
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The conflicting views of the question presented in the
cases we have been discussing and the meagreness of authority render it difficult to make any general statement as to the
law. In the few cases where the plaintiff has had an unlimited option to terminate, or an option only limited by the
requirement of a short notice of termination, as ten or thirty
days, the courts in the reported cases have refused to grant
the plaintiff's prayer on the alleged ground of lack of mutuality. Whether, however, the idea of Rust v. Conardwill be
persisted in, can fairly be considered doubtful. There is
tract on his right to specific performance. In that case B. agreed to
play baseball for one year for A. A. had a right to terminate the contract on ten days' notice. A. had also the right to reserve "B. for
another year." B. notified A. of his intention to exercise his option and
requested B. to sign for another year another contract "similar in tenor,
form and terms." B. refused, and was about to play for another party
when A. attempted to restrain him by injunction. Judge Thayer, who
decided the case, was of the opinion that the mere fact that B. could not
be made to play for A. would not prevent an order restraining him
playing for any one else, but he refused to issue the injunction for several reasons. First, he did not believe that there was a contract for a
year with an option to renew, but merely a contract with an option to
employ the defendant for another year on terms to be settled upon at
the time of re-employment. Of course such a contract is too indefinite to
enforce. Second, even if the contract is considered as one giving
an option to the plaintiff to renew with a clause for renewal, the
plaintiff must be considered as having an option to employ the
defendant for life or discharge him on ten days' notice. The learned
Judge was of the opinion that ".

. . it is perfectly apparent that such

a contract is so wanting in mutuality that no court of equity would lend
its aid to compel a compliance with it." (Page 63.) Here, however, the
court is using the term "want of mutuality" in the sense of inequitableness, and this inequality arises as much from the perpetual nature of the
defendant's obligations as from the clause giving the plaintiff the right
to terminate the contract.
Judge Thayer expressly refuses to deal with the contract as a contract
to renew without a clause for renewal because the plaintiff had asked
the defendant to sign a new contract "of similar tenor, form and terms."
This the court regarded as a demand to sign a contract with a clause of
renewal. "He," the defendant, "Is in no default therefore for refusing to
comply with the demand contained in that notice, and it is too late now
for them to give a fresh notice." (Page 63.) What the opinion of the
court on the effect of an option to terminate the contract where the
obligations of a contract were limited to a reasonable time it was not
necessary for the court to state.
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unquestionably a strong analogy between the defence of lack
of mutuality in the remedy and the defence that the court
cannot grant specific performance to the defendant and
therefore ought not to grant it to the plaintiff, because
on the defendant's bringing his bill against the plaintiff the
plaintiff could end the whole proceeding by electing to terminate the contract. On the other hand it must be admitted
that the cases are not identical. Where the defence is lack of
mutuality in the remedy, the court refuses to act at the
instance of the plaintiff because, should they make the
defendant perform his promise, they could not then turn
round and make the plaintiff perform his promise, not
because the plaintiff would not have any unexecuted promises
to perform, but because of the nature of the acts he has
promised to do. Thus B. promises to convey land to A. and
A. promises that on the conveyance he will perform for a
year certain personal services for B. A. cannot have specific performance of B.'s promise to convey, because of the
lack of mutuality in the remedy. For if the court should
compel B. to convey the land according to his promise to A.,
and thereafter A. should refuse to serve B. as agreed, the
court could not make A. perform these services at the suit
of B. Where, however, the plaintiff has a power to terminate the contract on a short notice or on no notice at all,
then the court would refuse to give specific performance at
the instance of the defendant because the parties themselves
have agreed that on notice of the plaintiff no contract should
exist between them. There is in this case no contract for
the court to enforce. In one case the court refuses to act
because of its own inability to make both parties live up to
their agreement, but in the case where the plaintiff has the
option to terminate the contract the court refuses to make
the defendant perform his promises because of what we
may call an infirmity in the contract. In England at
present the only idea now ever mentioned by the courts in
reference to the defence of lack of mutuality is the lack of
mutuality in the remedy. It is therefore probable that the
defence of lack of mutuality would never even be raised
there in a case where the plaintiff in a bill for specific performance had an option to terminate the contract. In this
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country, however, we have the oft-stated principle that a

contract, in order to be enforced by a court of equity, must
be "mutual in remedy and obligation."

This idea is respon-

sible for the decision in Rust v. Conard. The origin of the
idea and its usefulness as a rule of law, the writer hopes to
discuss at another time.
William Draper Lewis.

